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The fact that Taiwan set up an institution solely dedicated to transitional
justice only thirty years after the country’s democratization has made
Taiwan’s transitional justice experience unique among newly democratized
states. How and when transitional justice is approached and upheld will affect
a country’s stance toward its dark history and even re-make its democracy.
Taiwan is currently heralding a new experience that is determining for
Taiwan’s democratic future and that could serve as a valuable reference for
other countries that are to go through or are in the middle of democratization.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the years when Taiwan’s authoritarian rule was coming to an end,
political victims and civic organizations started to demand that the
government face up to its past wrongs and redress historical injustices. Before
2016, there was no shortage of apologies made by the president (of both major
parties when they held the executive branch) and compensations offered to
political victims and their families in response to their demands. However,
legislation addressing past human rights violations passed before 2016 was
limited in scope and conservative in language, as Caldwell rightly
argues, 1 while cases of political persecution were said to be caused by
misjudgments or flaws in the administrative process, rather than the
systematic product of a repressive state. In 2017, after the Democratic
Progressive Party (DPP) won both the presidency and the legislature for the
first time in Taiwan’s democratic history in 2016, the Act on Promoting
Transitional Justice (hereafter, Transitional Justice Act) cleared the floor in
the Legislative Yuan.

†
Hung-Ling Yeh is the Commissioner of the Transitional Justice Commission of Taiwan. ChingHsuan Su is a Research Fellow for the Transitional Justice Commission of Taiwan. The authors would like
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1
See Ernest Caldwell, Transitional Justice Legislation in Taiwan Before and During the Tsai
Administration, 27 WASH. INT’L L.J. 465–67 (2018).
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Caldwell characterized Taiwan’s transitional justice as having
developed in two phases, with the first period running from 1987 to 2016 and
the second starting from the DPP’s securing of both the presidency and the
legislative majority in 2016.2 Due to time constraints, he was not able to take
his observations further and said it remained to be seen how the Transitional
Justice Commission (“TJC” or “the Commission”), established in accordance
with the Transitional Justice Act in May 2018, would work to fill the “gaps of
knowledge and accountability” left unfilled and unresolved from the first
phase.3 The aim of this article is to answer this question, which has also been
raised by the victims, Taiwanese society, and international human rights
academics. The main tasks of the TJC will be laid out, followed by a
presentation of the approach that the TJC has taken for the redressing of past
judicial wrongs, one of the key indicators of the progress of Taiwan’s
transitional justice.
II.

THE TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE COMMISSION

The work of transitional justice was dispersed among various
government agencies before the establishment of the TJC. The National
Human Rights Museum, which is founded upon and transformed from former
White Terror prison compounds in Jingmei, New Taipei City, and on Green
Island, Taitung County, is administered by the Ministry of Culture, while the
National Development Council is the agency that supervises the collection
and management of the political archives. The National Human Rights
Museum and the National Development Council are both third-tier
government bodies. Overseeing the maintenance of statues of Chiang Kaishek that abound around the island, on the other hand, falls under the authority
of either municipal governments or schools.
On the compensation offered to victims, both February 28 Incident
victims and White Terror victims have been financially compensated by the
government. Taiwan has already issued a total of more than 26 billion NT
dollars (840 million U.S. dollars) of compensation to its political victims.
Notwithstanding this achievement, the demand for truth and ending impunity
had nevertheless gone unanswered. Corresponding agencies for the planning
and execution of tasks such as redressing past judicial injustice and holding
perpetrators accountable had been non-existent before the TJC. The
imperative work of transitional justice, including excavating and restoring
2
3

Id. at 451–52.
Id. at 480–83.

July 2019

Never Too Late—The Work of the TJC in Taiwan

611

historical truth, reinstituting justice, and compensating the victims, had been
lacking in systematicity and consistency, which was why the TJC had to be
established.
The TJC is an independent, second-tier government agency overseen
by the Executive Yuan, consisting of nine commission members, five of
whom are full-time while the rest are part-time. The commission members, as
stipulated by the Transitional Justice Act, are nominated by the Premier and
subject to legislative review and confirmation. The commission includes a
maximum of three members from the same political party and no fewer than
three members from each gender. With its nominees confirmed in May 2018,
the TJC was officially founded at the end of the same month, with a
semiannual budget of 1.7 million U.S. dollars (from June to December 2018)
and a staff of about seventy people. Within two years, the Transitional Justice
Act stipulates, the TJC shall “submit a hardcopy mission conclusion report to
the Premier” regarding the tasks it has been assigned.4 “If the Commission is
unable to complete its work within two years, it may report to the Premier and
request an extension; each extension shall be no longer than one year,” the
law states.5
As an independent administrative institution, “the TJC shall exercise its
authorities of office independently in accordance with the law” and its
members “shall exercise their authorities of office in an independent and nonpartisan manner, and shall not take part in the activities of any political party
during their terms,” according to the Transitional Justice Act.6 In practice,
there are currently two commission members with DPP party membership in
the commission. Furthermore, the fact that the commission is a second-level
government agency has guaranteed a considerable amount of power for the
commission to coordinate between government agencies of different levels
and to hold a comprehensive view of its plan.
The TJC consists of four departments for the end of accomplishing the
tasks assigned by the provisions of the Transitional Justice Act. First, the
Department of Historical Truth Restoration is tasked to investigate, on the
basis of the political archives and statements made by concerned parties, the
repressive institutions consolidated by the Temporary Provisions Effective
4

See Cujin Zhuanxing Zhengyi Tiaolo (促進轉型正義條例) [Act on Promoting Transitional Justice],
art. 11 (Dec. 27, 2017), https://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCODE=A0030296.
5
Id.
6
Id. art. 12.
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During the Period of Communist Rebellion and the human rights violations
committed under them. The results of the investigations will help the
commission determine the source of human rights abuses, identify the
perpetrators and participants in the oppression mechanisms and thereby assign
accountability. The department is also to establish a database by integrating
resources from existing archives of past court-martial trials, in which the
perpetrators and those who had been involved in the repression and how
human rights were violated will be made public. The database, when
completed, will provide in-depth and insightful information on Taiwan’s past
authoritarian model.
The Department of Authoritarian Relics Handling, the second
department, is tasked with inspecting the number and locations of the statues
or memorials commemorating authoritarian rulers Chiang Kai-shek and
Chiang Ching-kuo. The department will explain to the public why the
commemoration contradicts the democratic constitutional order and work to
remove the authoritarian symbols on the basis of social consensus. Locating
historical sites where victims used to be imprisoned, detained, tortured, and
interrogated is also one of the department’s missions. The TJC will later
determine whether the sites are to be turned into memorials or tourist spots
incorporating local culture. Handling authoritarian relics, which includes
erasing symbols that are nostalgic or in memorial of the authoritarian ruler(s)
in public buildings and spaces and preserving the sites of past injustice for
educational purposes, will prevent and caution the future generations against
the rise and return of authoritarianism.
The third department, the Department of Redressing Past Judicial
Wrongs, is to dissolve the legality of the past authoritarian rule and to reinstate
the victims’ reputation. The department reviews the political verdicts to
identify the victims before expunging their records of punishment and
confiscation and making an official and public announcement of the
expungement. The department is able to do so because the victims’
convictions have been annulled since December 27, 2018, the date on which
Transitional Justice Act was promulgated. The legislative revocation (of
convictions) and how confiscated properties could be returned or
compensated will be further discussed in the next section where Taiwan’s
approach to redressing past judicial wrongs is explained. The department is
also trying to formulate a mechanism for the purification of the personnel
system, also known as lustration law in Eastern Europe, and setting up a
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method for the restitution of properties illegally acquired by the government,
individuals, or institutions during the period of authoritarian rule.
The Department of Rebuilding Social Trust works on addressing
psychological traumas and also on planning the use of the ill-gotten party
assets to promote and assist in transitional justice, human rights education,
long-term care and other social welfare policies, and other transitional justicerelated cultural projects. The department has also started to train voluntary
counseling psychologists to help the TJC deal with the psychological traumas
caused by past political violence.
The two-year term TJC, at the end of its mission, will publish a final
report, on the basis of the work of the four departments—namely, collected
statements, investigative findings, archival materials, and the commission’s
efforts made to prevent the rise of authoritarian nostalgia and address
psychological traumas caused by past political violence. The final report will
reveal how human rights were violated during the February 28 Incident and
the White Terror Period by the repressive institutions for the “mobilization for
the suppression of the communist rebellion” and under martial law.
Redressing judicial wrongs is one of the most important among the
TJC’s various tasks. However, of all the authoritarian legacies in Taiwan that
remain to be dealt with, judicial wrongs have been one of, and perhaps even
the most, thorny authoritarian leftovers when efforts were made to settle them
within the bureaucracy. One of the main characteristics of Taiwan’s
authoritarian rule was systematic human rights violations through military
trials; on the face of it, the military trials were conducted in accordance with
the “law,” but the legitimacy of the laws and the judgments has since been
called into question by today’s standard.
III.

REDRESSING THE JUDICIAL WRONGS

The lifting of martial law in 1987 has often been regarded as the
beginning of Taiwan’s democratization process, followed by the abolition of
the Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of Communist
Rebellion in 1991 and the amendment to Article 100 of the Criminal Code
(which criminalized seditious “intentions”) in 1992. Since then, subversive
intentions and speech could no longer be criminally punished, which signified
the dawn of a new democratic period.
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However, following these moves, the then-ruling Kuomintang (“KMT”)
government failed to initiate the transitional justice project as other new
democracies had done. Not only did it fail to do so, the KMT government
further took advantage of its remaining authority to pass the National Security
Act as “supporting measures” to the lifting of martial law that effectively
precluded civilians tried under martial law from appealing their convictions
in civil court in the post-martial law period, which is a right guaranteed by the
Martial Law Act.
Legal scholar Tay-Sheng Wang argued that passing the National
Security Act reflected “the KMT government’s full respect for the formal
legality of the courts-martial trials, which sanctioned state inaction regarding
possible past injustice, and its explicit denial of transitional justice.” 7 The
constitutionality of the legislation was later further confirmed by the
Constitutional Court in Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 272 in 1991, citing
“the maintaining of stability and consistency of the judicial process and of the
social order” as imperative and thereby, Wang argued, “tacitly validated and
legitimated the human rights abuses perpetrated by the KMT officials during
the martial law period.”8
The interpretation had two following implications. First, by upholding
the importance of “the maintaining of stability and consistency of the judicial
process and of the social order,” the Court’s interpretation placed a major
barrier to the victims’ recourse to justice. Second, as those cases cannot be
appealed in civil court for reconsideration in the post-democratization time,
investigating the legality (or the absence of it) of the court-martial trials was
practically out of the question.
The Transitional Justice Act was passed by the legislature at the end of
2017. Article 6 of the act directly addresses the redressing of past judicial
wrongs and upends the conservative mentality and measures depicted in the
preceding paragraphs.
Article 6(3) of the Transitional Justice Act stipulates that those victims
who have been compensated or have had their rights re-instituted in
accordance with the February 28 Incident Disposition and Compensation Act
(1995), the Compensation Act for Wrongful Trials on Charges of Sedition and
7
See Tay-Sheng Wang, Transitional Justice in Taiwan: A Dialogue among the Past, the Present and
the Future, 315 TAIWAN L.J. 1 (2017).
8
See Judicial Yuan [J.Y.] Interpretation No. 272, DAFAGUAN JIESHI [JIESHI] (Const. Ct. Jan. 18, 1980),
https://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/p03_01.asp?expno=272; Caldwell, supra note 1, at 462.
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Espionage during the Martial Law Period (1998), and the Act Governing the
Recovery of Damage of Individual Rights during the Period of Martial Law
(1995/2000), shall see the related convictions voided and their criminal
records expunged from the date on which the Act entered into force
(December 27, 2017). And for those who did not meet the above descriptions,
including those who had been ruled guilty of taking part in subversive
activities and therefore denied compensation, the TJC—acting ex officio or
upon application by the concerned party—will be able to review their criminal
convictions, which, if determined to be judicial wrongs, are also to be annulled
and expunged from the record. As to how the confiscated properties are to be
returned to the victims following the expunging of the record of confiscation,
the TJC is now estimating the amount and value and sorting out the categories
(e.g., lots of land, buildings, or cash) of the properties confiscated. Regular
meetings with experts and professionals are conducted to discuss possible
future measures.
There are reasons why the Transitional Justice Act, legislated only
thirty years after democratization, has chosen to remedy the judicial injustice
by means of direct legislative revocation instead of going through the judicial
system for re-trials. As the country’s political victims are dying off, the
judicial process initiated by individual victims, which might drag on for years,
would be an impractical approach for the septuagenarians and octogenarians
to attain their rightful justice. Also, for historical cases like these, the
preservation and acquisition of intact evidence is unlikely, a fact that might
not facilitate the victims’ winning the case in court even if they appeal. Finally,
transitional justice has never been carried out in Taiwan’s judicial system,
which has not been reformed since the authoritarian period. As the court is
itself a target of the transitional justice project, it is doubtful that it would be
able to shoulder the arduous task and political responsibility of re-interpreting
the legal order.9
Since the establishment of the TJC on May 31, 2018, the Commission
has invested considerable resources in order to restore the justice of the
victims as fast as possible. After reviewing and conducting a comparative
check on the documents from various government agencies, the TJC
announced on October 5, 2018, the first list of a total of 1,270 victims whose
convictions were to be revoked. The list was published in the official
Executive Yuan Gazette and on the official website of the TJC.
9

Wang, supra note 7.
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The TJC also held a grand announcement ceremony for announcing the
list on the same day. The ceremony was held in the five-star Sheraton Grand
Taipei Hotel in Taipei, where the most notorious detention center in the 1950s
used to sit. More than 200 political victims and their families were present at
the ceremony, the most senior of whom is 98 years old, a survivor of and
partaker in the February 28 Uprising in 1947. President Tsai Ing-wen, along
with Premier Lai Ching-deok of the Executive Yuan, Legislative Speaker Su
Chia-chyuan, and Control Yuan President Chang Po-ya, attended the
ceremony.
Three representatives of the victims making remarks during the
ceremony stressed that the TJC’s task of annulling their convictions was
“immensely meaningful” for them. President Tsai Ing-wen again apologized
to the victims at the ceremony, acknowledging that the revocation came too
late for all of the victims to see their convictions voided.
However, concerning the said progress made by the TJC, two
subsequent issues are worthy of our attention. The first is the cost of opting
for legislative revocation of the convictions: skipping the judicial process that
entails re-investigation is simple and fast, but the price is that truth is then
hard to come by. The other difficulty is the question of how the TJC
investigates those cases that had failed to receive compensation or
reinstitution of rights, and at the same time establishes the legitimacy and
authority of its decisions.
The risk of sacrificing the truth for early justice, in the absence of other
means within the existing system, could be offset and compensated by making
more political archives public—another of TJC’s major tasks—and
encouraging more research into them. As for the second difficulty, while the
TJC is far from on a par with the court in terms of legal expertise and
procedural soundness, it has convened a review team consisting of
professionals from academia and the field of legal practice to conduct the
necessary investigations. The TJC is expecting that the legal professionals will
substantiate the decisions made by the Commission with solid arguments to
enhance their legitimacy.
The work of redressing past judicial wrongs, we believe, would help
wean Taiwan from the tendency to infringe upon human rights in the name of
state security. In a time when the world is witnessing serious democratic
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backsliding, Taiwan’s hard-earned democracy can be a valuable example and
model.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Taiwan’s stable and vibrant democracy is unique in Asia. How its
transitional justice effort has transitioned and developed from the early postdemocratization period to what it is now might also provide a unique
perspective to the existing related research and practice.
For Taiwan (and possibly many other Asian countries as well), the
terminology of “transitional justice” might have been imported, but the
concept of compensating the victims and disclosing historical truth, among
various other related objectives, in order to redress the past wrongs, is native
and has long been promoted by the Taiwanese civil society and victim groups
since as early as the 1990s, when the country was just embarking on the
democratization process.
Today, with the support from society, the TJC has been established to
carry out the work of transitional justice more systematically, such as
redressing past judicial wrongs and assigning responsibility and
accountability for human rights violations. Although with the current
approach, the challenges and difficulties described earlier might arise, we are
confident in our ability to learn lessons from other countries’ precedents, and
expect that our experience could also be an example for other societies with
Chinese culture background or newly democratized states in the future. We
believe that this is the best gift that a small country like Taiwan can offer to
the democratic world.
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